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AN ECONOMIC DEFENSE OF FLEXIBILITY IN
IPR LICENSING: CONTRACTING AROUND
"FIRST SALE" IN MULTILEVEL PRODUCTION
SETTINGS
Anne Layne-Farrar*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the debate that swirled just before and after the
release of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Quanta
Computer v. LG Electronics, Inc.' during the summer of 2008,
it was clear that the basic principle of first sale was not so
much at issue; rather the Court sought to delineate the
doctrine's metes and bounds. While the delineation of
boundaries is primarily a matter of law, and thus best left to
judges or to lawyers, one specific boundary has considerable
economic implications. The particular issue of whether firms
should be allowed to contract around the first sale doctrine
when multiple levels of production are involved-in essence,
negating the doctrine's application through the use of specific
terms and conditions in a contract agreement-is as much an
economic question as it is a legal question. I address this
economic question in this paper.2
* Anne Layne-Farrar is a Vice President with Compass LexEcon. This
paper extends ideas first developed in a theoretical paper co-authored with
Gerard Llobet and Jorge Padilla. Dr. Layne-Farrar wishes to thank Eric
Goldman, Gerard Llobet, and the participants of the Exhaustion and First Sale
in IP Symposium at Santa Clara University for helpful comments and
suggestions, and Dhiren Patki and Alina Marinova for research assistance. The
ideas and opinions, as well as any errors, in this paper are exclusively her own.
Comments should be sent to alayne-farrar@compasslexecon.com.
1. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). The
court found that patent exhaustion does indeed apply to method patents, and
thus the doctrine applied to LG Electronics' patents, as embodied in Intel's
components sold to Quanta Computers. Id. at 631.
2. The primary focus in this paper is patents, although I consider some
analogous situations relevant for copyrights and Droit de Suite, an IP doctrine
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My decidedly non-legal reading of the Supreme Court's
decision in Quanta asserts that the Court did not rule out
such contractual flexibility for patents. The decision appears
to leave open the question of contractual restrictions, stating
only in footnote seven that "[w]e note that the authorized
nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE's
other contract rights. LGE's complaint does not include a
breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on
whether contract damages might be available even though
exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages."'
Similar arguments can be made with respect to
copyright, where the First Sale doctrine has faced
considerable controversy now that copyrighted materials can
be "sold" online. While there is no multilevel production
during the sale of a copyright, there can be a chain of buyers.
Before the advent of the Internet, copyright holders could
count on the time and expense of making a physical copy of
their protected works to restrict end buyers from doing so.
This barrier limited the spread of unauthorized copies and
thus maintained compensation through the sale of authorized
first copies. Today, however, that self-policing mechanism is
no longer reliable: end consumers can and do make copies of
digital material for wide distribution on the Internet. This
means a copyright holder may not receive anywhere close to a
market rate of return on his material.4 This dynamic has led
to a running debate between rights holders and consumers.
Rights holders want to impose technological means of
restricting users' ability to copy and distribute protected
works online.5 Consumers, on the other hand, believe that
the unfettered rights in place in the physical world, including
first sale, should translate in full to the online world.' For
applicable to the sale of fine arts in certain jurisdictions.
3. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 637 n.7 (citing Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.,
157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895)).
4. For a discussion of the impact that digital technology has had on
copyright, see generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN
DIGITAL MEDIA (2004) available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-
09-Copyright.pdf.
5. It is widely accepted for online publishers and device manufacturers to
use a variety of access control and tracking techniques (known as DRM) to
restrict the access and distribution of digital content. See ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Digital Rights Management, http//www.eff.org/issues/
drm (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
6. Opponents of DRM argue that the digital restrictions infringe on rights
[Vol:511150
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example, e-book reader programs like Adobe Reader and
Microsoft Reader do not allow the user to print, copy, or paste
the online material from one online account to another online
or offline repository, even though those restrictions have
faced stiff opposition by purchasers.'
Finally, note that some jurisdictions take a flexible
approach to the application of first sale for works of art, one
that is analogous to relaxing the copyright first sale doctrine.
Specifically, consider the European doctrine known as Droit
de Suite (DDS). The DDS rule guarantees a royalty to the
creator of a work of art based upon the price obtained in its
future resale. California's equivalent of DDS, for instance,
provides the artist with five percent of the resale price of a
covered work, so long as that price exceeds both $1,000 and
the price initially paid by the reseller.8 Rather than limiting
the creator to the revenues available from the first sale of the
artwork, DDS allows the artist (and his or her heirs, for up to
twenty years after the artists' death) to benefit financially
from the resale of an original painting, sculpture, drawing, or
work in glass.
In all three of these instances, advocates for a strict
application of the first sale doctrine have argued that
allowing rights holders to charge more than one party-either
that copyright purchasers have in the offline world. See, e.g., Richard Watt, The
Past and the Future of the Economics of Copyright, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 151, 164 (2004) ("DRM may also violate certain private
rights, as for example is the case of copy-proof CD Roms, since there exists the
right of private copy in almost all countries."). See also David Bach, The Double
Punch of Law and Technology: Fighting Music Piracy or Remaking Copyright in
a Digital Age?, 6 BUS. & POL., no. 2 at 1, 15-16 (2004)
Whereas it was not feasible to charge newspaper readers for a
photocopied article, it is feasible to charge a reader a fee to access an
article e-mailed by a friend. Similarly, whereas the recording industry
could not reasonably charge for a tape recording off the radio, online
services such as MusicNet and Rhapsody can fairly easily charge
consumers for every track they want to burn onto a CD, and they are
doing just that. The double punch thus clearly raises a critical
question: do previously tolerated fair use exceptions constitute basic
consumer rights, or were they merely an economic deadweight loss that
new digital technologies help eliminate?
Id.
7. Typically, DRM protests come in the form of "computer hacks" that
enable buyers to do that which the seller is attempting to prohibit digitally.
See, e.g., Amazon's Kindle has Copyright Protection Hacked, BBC NEWS (Dec.
29, 2009, 8:40 AM), http//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8428126.stm.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (Deering 2010).
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along a vertical production chain for patents, or along a time
horizon for copyrighted material and works of art-amounts
to "double dipping." In other words, the rights holder will
charge twice for the use of the same rights, thereby extracting
"too much" from rights users.9
The foundation for the concern over double dipping is
easy to understand. Once a rights holder has sold a good
embodying the covered rights and has received an
economically justifiable payment for those rights in exchange,
how could a second payment be warranted? Two economic
issues render the answer to this question less than obvious:
economically justified reward and economically efficient
licensing.
The first issue, economically justified reward, concerns
the compensation a rights holder can expect to earn from the
value of her creation. Specifically, the license fees (or sales
price) received for a protected property should be the market
determined value. This value should be computed without
resort to the "hold up" of any ex post irreversible investments
a licensee or rights purchaser may have made.'o
In relation to patents, it is well known that Congress
enacted the Patent Act as a means of promoting "the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts . . . ."i In other words, a
patent is a temporary right to exclude others, and is meant to
provide incentives for inventors to create "useful"
technological contributions for society. A patent is therefore a
legal arrangement with the government; it is not a natural
entitlement. Likewise, copyright protection is also granted by
the government and is typically fully enforceable only when
the copyright holder has officially registered his rights.12 And
9. For patents, see, e.g., Brief of Minebea Co., Ltd as Amicus Curiae In
Support of Petitioners at 4, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S.
617 (2008) (No. 06-937). For copyright, see DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 682 (Eberhard
Becker, Willms Buhse, Dirk Ginnewig & Niels Rump eds., 2003). For DDS, see
Victor Ginsburgh, The Economic Consequences of Droit de Suite in the European
Union, 35 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 35, 61-71 (2005).
10. For a discussion of the conditions where patent hold up may occur, see
generally Vincenzo Denicol6, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge
Padilla, Revisiting Injunctive Relief Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries
with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571 (2008).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. See Copyright in General (FAQ), UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
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clearly, DDS is only applicable where a law is on the books-
it does not naturally arise in the sale of works of art.
While neither copyright nor patent laws impose limits on
what a rights holder can charge a user or licensee, the
granted rights should enable the rights holder to earn enough
of a financial return so as to provide strong incentives to
create and innovate. This can be done by either investing in
risky research and development, or engaging in costly or time
consuming creative production. The rights, however, should
not be so strong that they deprive society of the benefits of the
innovation or grind all subsequent follow-on innovation to a
halt.13 Intellectual property law, then, generally allows a
rights holder to keep a protected creation for its own use, to
refuse to license or sell the creation altogether, or to set the
usage terms as the rights holder and user collectively see fit
during negotiations.
In the context of economically justified rewards, the
concern over double dipping is well illustrated by Justice
Breyer's analogy in the Quanta case.1 4 Justice Breyer
Copyright is a form of protection grounded in the U.S. Constitution
and granted by law for original works of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. . . . [C]opyright exists from the moment the
work is created. You will have to register, however, if you wish to bring
a lawsuit for infringement of a U.S. work.
Id.
13. There is extensive literature regarding the static, as well as the
dynamic, effects of intellectual property rights. Regarding the first, the trade-
off between patent length and breadth has been discussed in papers such as
Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21
RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990) and Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990). The dynamic trade-offs are
discussed in Jerry Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in
Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995).
14. Oral Argument at 1:20, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937) available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2007/2007_06_937/argument. During oral argument Justice Breyer
stated:
Imagine that I want to buy some bicycle pedals, so I go to the
bicycle shop. These are fabulous pedals. The inventor has licensed
somebody to make them, and he sold them to the shop, make and sell
them. He sold them to the shop. I go buy the pedals. I put it in my
bicycle. I start pedaling down the road.
Now, we don't want nineteen patent inspectors chasing me or all of
the other companies and there are many doctrines in the law designed
to stop that. One is the equitable servitudes on chattel. Another is the
exhaustion of a patent. And now you talk about implied license.
I would say, why does it make that much difference? What we're
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described firm X, holding a patent on a particular design for a
bicycle pedal that it licensed for a royalty to firm Y to use the
design and attach the resulting pedal to a bike.15  Justice
Breyer then reasoned that when Y sells the bike to a retail
shop, patent holder X cannot also charge the retail shop a
royalty for the pedal design." Nor, when the retail shop sells
the bike to a consumer, can firm X chase the consumer down
the street to get yet another royalty payment for the pedal
design from the bicycle rider."
Implicit in Justice Breyer's example is the assumption
that there exists one tradable right: the ability to
manufacture and sell the pedal design. The same assumption
is often made in regard to copyrights: a book containing a
protected work is a tangible product that, once sold, passes
out of the control of the rights holder. When just one right is
offered, charging for any use coming further down in the
production chain (say, the sale of a bike pedal to a bike
assembler), or further down in the use chain (say, the resale
of the book to a second hand book shop or the resale of a
painting to a new collector), can be considered double dipping,
charging multiple times for the same right."s
Intellectual property rights (IPR) can be thought of as a
bundle of distinct rights, rather than as a single right.'9 For
talking about here is whether after those pedals are sold to me under
an agreement that the patent-you know, you have a right to sell them
to me-why can't I look at this as saying that patent is exhausted, the
patent on the pedals and the patent for those bicycles insofar as that
patent for the bicycles says I have a patent on inserting the pedal into a
bicycle.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. "LGE was improperly attempting to obtain a double royalty." Brief for
Petitioners at 10, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)
(No. 06-937).
19. This was an argument raised by MPEG LA LLC, as a friend of the court
on behalf of LG Electronics. In particular, MPEG's brief stated that "[tihe right
to make and sell a device may have one value, while the right to use that device
may have completely different values to different parties." Brief for MPEG LA
LLC as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondent at 24, Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937). See also Stephen L. Carter,
Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
715, 716 (1993). See generally Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
Copyright material in digital form can also be parsed into separate rights, as
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instance, there are separate and distinct rights to exclude
others from using, making, or selling a good. These rights, in
turn, can be split again, say into the right for others to sell in
the Southern states versus the Northern states, or with a
global portfolio of patents, the right to sell in the U.S. versus
Europe, Asia, or elsewhere. This division of rights can be
especially pertinent with intangible goods, such as for patent
protected software or for a copyright protected book in
electronic format.
Since IPR can embody a bundle of rights, the other
pivotal economic concept in IPR licensing: economic efficiency
is implicated. Just as the legal bargain offered in IPR
balances incentives to innovate and to disclose that
innovation against a limited term of exclusivity, it is also in
society's best interest to design IPR rules so that rights
holders have the incentives and the ability to sell or license
their creation for broad implementation or use.20 Society
reaps the benefits of a new invention or a creative work
mainly through diffusion and implementation. We therefore
need to understand any impediments that might stand in the
way of efficient licensing or selling that would hinder the
diffusion and implementation of useful innovations.
One important distinction to keep in mind in considering
the bifurcation of rights and their licensing, however, is the
original rationale for the first sale doctrine: an increased
certainty over the "price" of a good, arising when limits are
placed on the parties that can be charged licensing fees.2 If
an end purchaser of a good has no reasonable way of knowing
whether the good comes with unseen obligations, such as
licensing fees on the components that form the inputs of the
noted by the Congressional Budget Office:
Consumers would pay according to the particular "rights" that they are
able to exercise over a copyrighted work in digital form. For example,
DRM technology would prevent consumers who pay for only a few
rights (say, to listen to a music file from a compact disc or the Internet)
from exercising the additional usage rights (both to listen to and to
make copies of the file) that are available to consumers who pay more.
DRM technology could likewise be used to control consumers' ability to
redistribute the copies that are made.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at ix.
20. See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property:
When Is It the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 51 (2002).
21. R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital
Networks, 44 B. C. L. REV. 577, 584 (2003).
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good, then uncertainty will hinder the exchange of goods and
the dissemination of the innovations underlying those goods.
The task, then, is to understand when relaxing first sale over
a production chain will offer net benefits, versus when the
cost of uncertainty calls for first sale's strict application.
I consider these issues in this paper. In particular, I
consider the circumstances where flexibility in the application
of the first sale doctrine to patent licensing for intermediate
goods is economically efficient. I also consider, albeit less
thoroughly, the sale of copyrighted works and the sale of
works of art. On this point, I base my discussion on a
technical companion paper that models the economics of
patent licensing.22 By this approach, I find that under many
realistic scenarios involving business-to-business patent
licensing, social welfare is improved when a rights holder has
the ability to split fees for use of the right across multiple
parties. In more limited circumstances, splitting fees over
users may make sense for copyrights and DDS scenarios as
well. Indeed, the possibility for double dipping has nothing to
do with the application of the first sale doctrine but depends
instead on the rights holder's ability to exploit ex post
investments in commercializing a protected creation.
Therefore, it is more favorable to allow a flexible approach to
first sale under certain scenarios-an approach that allows
knowledgeable parties to contract around first sale's
application when little or no cost of uncertainty is imposed
and when it makes sense for the parties to do so.
This paper proceeds as follows. It begins by examining
patent exhaustion in an unrealistic world where transaction
costs and market frictions do not exist.23 This theoretical
environment provides a simple vehicle for understanding the
key economic issues underlying the first sale doctrine as
applied to multilevel production. With this benchmark in
place, this paper then discusses how the application of the
first sale doctrine might change when frictions, such as
government regulations or restrictions on pricing, and
transaction costs, such as the time and effort involved in
22. Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, An Economic Take
on Patent Licensing: Understanding the Implications of the 'First Sale Patent
Exhaustion'Doctrine (Working Paper 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstrac
t=1418048. All assertions made here are proven in the technical paper.
23. See infra Part II.
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licensing negotiations, are present.24 In the presence of these
frictions, a strict application of patent exhaustion in licensing
for multilevel production is problematic because it can lead to
under-compensation for rights holders, and thus lead to a
reduction in the number of transactions over protected goods.
Next, this paper addresses the potential anticompetitive
problems, including double dipping, which might arise in IPR
licensing if the first sale doctrine allows for contractual
circumvention in business-to-business licensing or other
narrow circumstances with clear notification of licensing
terms and conditions.2 5 As noted above, double dipping is a
distinct issue from first sale that depends on its own set of
circumstances. This paper concludes by making the point
that the ability to contract around first sale in the defined
instances is important for economic efficiency reasons."
II. PATENT EXHAUSTION IN AN IDEALIZED WORLD
As a simple thought experiment to clarify ideas and
provide a benchmark for comparison, consider first a world
without frictions: all information is public and readily
available, firms are free to set prices for the goods they sell
and adjust them as costs and market conditions change, and
negotiation among firms jointly maximizes the benefits of the
parties involved. In such an idealized world, the way that
IPR fees are structured for the production of goods would not
matter, rendering the patent exhaustion doctrine wholly
irrelevant, save for its application to end consumers.
To understand why IPR fee structuring would be
irrelevant in this idealized world, consider a variation on
Justice Breyer's example. A patent holder has a patent on a
bike pedal design. Assume that bicycle production is split
into two steps: an upstream producer makes bike
components, including the pedals incorporating the patented
technology, and then sells them to a downstream producer,
who assembles the components into bikes that are ultimately
sold to consumers. Suppose that, in accordance with a strict
application of patent exhaustion, the patent holder initially
only charges one firm a royalty; assume it is the downstream
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
manufacturer who obtains a license to assemble and sell
bicycles incorporating the patented pedal, while the upstream
component maker obtains no license.27 What would happen if
the patent holder changed this scheme and instead began
charging part of the royalty burden upstream, raising the
upstream royalty from zero, but also lowering the
downstream royalty so as to leave the aggregate royalty
income for the patent holder unchanged?
In our ideal world with no transaction costs or frictions,
the intermediate component price the upstream
manufacturer charges the downstream firm would simply rise
to accommodate the increase in costs that the upstream
manufacturer faces. In other words, the upstream
manufacturer would pass on the additional costs (the newly
assessed royalty payment) to its customers, the downstream
assemblers, exactly offsetting the cost-savings enjoyed by the
downstream producer from the lower royalty rate. This pass-
through element is the fundamental insight of economist
Ronald Coase in his famous theorem on the reallocation of
costs to achieve an economically efficient outcome.28
But to reach this outcome, I assumed that the patent
holder kept its aggregate royalty income (i.e., the sum of the
up and downstream royalty revenues) the same. Do we need
this assumption? Why wouldn't the patent holder instead
take advantage of the multiple licensing points to increase
the aggregate royalty rate? It turns out that doing so is not
in the patent holder's best interests; profit maximizing
incentives give us the same result without imposing any
constraints on firm behavior.
When licensing just one party in the production chain-
either the upstream component maker or the downstream
assembler-the patent holder will set the royalty rate to
maximize total licensing profits. Two forces are at play
whenever a firm raises its price: first, the firm earns a larger
profit margin on each unit sold in the downstream market,
but second, as prices increase consumers tend to purchase
fewer goods. So, firms must balance the per-unit increase
27. First sale would still apply for the sale of the bicycle to end consumers,
who could not be charged royalty fees for the pedal design. See Oral Argument
at 1:20, supra note 14.
28. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
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against the accompanying decrease in units sold. If the first
effect outweighs the second, the price increase will increase
profits. If, on the other hand, the negative quantity effect
outweighs the positive margin effect, profits will fall. The
optimal price achieves the perfect balance, and thus
maximizes profits. Just as they are in all profit maximization
problems, these dual forces are at play for the upstream
patent holder: the patent holder sets a rate to maximize its
royalty earnings. Moving from licensing just downstream to
both up and downstream firms does not alter the optimal
royalty earnings equation; the shift simply means the sources
of profit are divided. Thus, if a rights holder has found the
optimal royalty earnings in licensing one production level,
and then attempts to increase its profits by licensing another
level, it will instead find that the decrease in the units sold
outweighs the increase in the per-unit margin, and making
the new higher "price" less profitable.
The presence of multiple production layers does
complicate the dynamics, although the forces of profit
maximization remain the same. First, within a vertical
production chain,2 9 an upstream firm will only sell its
components if the downstream assembly firm demands them.
This, in turn, is dictated by the demand for the final good in
the downstream market. The upstream firm therefore faces
"derived demand" linked to the ultimate downstream
market.30 Second, within a vertical production chain in our
idealized world, any cost that an upstream link faces will be
passed on to the downstream link, and ultimately to the end
customer.
The firms facing derived demand upstream in the
production process, combined with the cost pass-through
noted above, means that downstream demand influences a
patent holder's licensing fees regardless of where in the
production chain of firms the patent holder chooses to license.
If the patent holder attempts to charge "too high" of a royalty
29. In a vertical production chain, one firm hands an intermediate product
off to another firm to continue the production process, working in this fashion
until the final good reaches the consumer. For example, glass lenses are
frequently made by one firm, while another firm polishes them and inserts them
into frames; the finished lenses are then distributed through a third link in the
chain: specialty stores or optometrists.
30. For a discussion of "derived demand," see PAUL A. SAMUELSON &
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONoMics 213-14 (McGraw-Hill 1998).
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rate to an intermediate goods supplier, that supplier will pass
on its increased costs to its customers, who will then pass
their increased costs on in the price of the final good. End
consumers, thus, will face higher prices. As fundamental
economics teaches, when prices rise for consumers, the
quantity they demand generally falls. Therefore, in setting
royalty rates, a patent holder must strike a balance, just as
any price setter must. While raising the royalty rate
increases the revenue dollars the patent holder earns on each
covered unit sold, that royalty rate represents a cost to the
licensees, who will pass the cost along the production chain to
the end consumers. The higher price, therefore, will likely
lower the number of units sold downstream and, in the
process, lower the royalty base charged by the patent holder.
If the number of units sold fall by more than the per unit
revenue increases, the patent holder's profits will decline,
making the royalty increase unprofitable.
These licensing dynamics are highly relevant to any
discussion of first sale or patent exhaustion. When faced with
a multilevel production chain, an IPR holder will set licensing
rates to maximize its overall profits in light of the
(anticipated or known) demand in the ultimate downstream
market. This is true whether the IPR holder licenses one
firm, or many firms, along the production chain. Even if an
IPR holder charges a royalty at two or more points in the
production chain, there is only one ultimate downstream
market constraining the royalty rates charged.
Suppose that a patent holder determines that charging
the downstream firm a royalty of five percent of the sales
price maintains a healthy marketplace with sufficient
demand so as to maximize licensing profits. Later, the patent
holder decides to expand its licensing program to include
upstream producers who provide inputs used by the
downstream firms. Next, suppose that the patent holder
keeps the downstream royalty rate at five percent and
imposes an additional one percent royalty rate on upstream
firms' sales. The upstream firms will face increased costs
that will be passed on to their customers, the downstream
producers, by raising their wholesale price to recoup the one
percent royalty rate. Since the upstream royalty is passed on
to the downstream firms by way of the wholesale price, it is
as if the downstream firms faced a higher royalty rate, in
IVol:511160
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excess of five percent. The downstream royalty will thus
exceed the optimal level for maximizing the patent holder's
licensing profits and, by definition, the number of units sold
will fall by more than the per unit profit increases. When
charging an upstream royalty as well as a downstream one,
the patent holder will therefore want to lower the royalty rate
charged downstream. Adjusting both rates so as to keep the
aggregate royalty earnings unchanged enables the patent
holder to keep royalty profits at the optimal level. Thus, we
did not need to impose the condition that aggregate royalties
remained unchanged because that condition results naturally
from the parties' profit motives in this ideal world with no
market frictions.
With copyright and fine art sales, the "layers" at issue
are typically not vertical ones in the production process, but
rather different buyers separated by time. Generally, we do
not have one business with IPR licensing multiple other
businesses, but rather a rights holder licensing multiple end
users, changing the dynamics considerably. The issue
therefore becomes the impact of the IPR holder's ability to
charge fees both on the initial sale and on a subsequent resale
of the covered work.
Just as with patent holders, in our idealized world of
perfect information, under a DDS regime, the first purchaser
of a covered work would anticipate the application of royalty
fees on any later sale, meaning that the first sale price would
simply adjust to reflect the cost imposed on the resale.
Therefore, as long as the rules were clear to all purchasers, as
guaranteed by our benchmark assumption of perfect
information, then the total payment that the creator received
would be unchanged, just as the case with patents.
The key implication of the above analysis is that when
frictions are not present, patent exhaustion and prohibitions
on licensing multiple levels of the production-use chain
cannot be motivated by the need for a mechanism to constrain
the fees charged by IPR holders, as suggested in some of the
Quanta filings.3 1 Indeed, at least when frictions and
transaction costs are not an issue, the ability to charge
31. See Brief of Minebea Co. Ltd. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 9, at 2-3; Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae
at 17-18, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-
937).
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multiple parties in the production-use chain does not affect
an IPR holder's income. Therefore, the next questions are
whether and how the presence of transaction costs and
market frictions might alter the above analysis.
III. INTRODUCING TRANSACTION COSTS
In most instances, of course, market frictions and
transaction costs do exist and can be sufficiently large to
affect the parties' decision making. While the idealized world
described above is helpful in understanding key market
dynamics, in order to make the economic assessment of the
first sale doctrine meaningful, one must define a more
realistic scenario. This more realistic scenario is one that
recognizes the ubiquitous problems of transaction costs and
marketplace frictions. Therefore, my analysis turns to the
likely impact of such frictions on the optimal allocation of
royalties among potential licensees along a given production-
use chain, and examines the resulting implications for the
first sale doctrine. In particular, I consider two important
frictions: information frictions, such as the existence of
private information or uncertainty, and cost pass-through
frictions, where constraints prevent upstream licensees from
fully passing through royalty cost increases to their
downstream customers. I also discuss the additional
precautions required when consumers are involved, as is the
case in copyright and DDS sales.
A. The Importance of Information Frictions in Multi-Level
Licensing
Consider first the implications of private information.
Typically, royalty payments depend on the amount of the
covered good actually sold in the marketplace, with a running
royalty rate applied to a revenue royalty base. For example,
suppose the parties agree to a royalty of five percent applied
to the wholesale price of the covered good, payable each
quarter. The licensee must then report to the patent holder
its quarterly sales turnover (the total number of units sold,
multiplied by the wholesale price). The literature has
proposed many explanations for the predominance of
licensing contracts of this sort, mainly related to private
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information and uncertainty over downstream demand.32 As
opposed to the sale of a physical good, where total sales can
be estimated from the units of the input transferred, patents
and copyright can allow for an unlimited number of units.
That means IPR holders must be able to verify the quantities
of covered goods sold by a licensee in order to calculate the
royalty payments owed. It also means that licensees can have
incentives to underreport sales in order to reduce their
licensing payments. In this case, enforcing a contract is more
complicated, requiring licensor monitoring and verification
procedures.
In particular, if a patent license contract includes a
percentage royalty rate or a per-unit fee-terms that are used
commonly in patent licensing as risk sharing mechanisms 33
then the patent holder has a strong interest in setting the
base for the royalty calculations on observable or verifiable
quantities that licensed firms sell. Ambiguity over the
relevant quantities sold, and hence over the basis for royalty
payments, is an important difference between the licensing of
intellectual property and the sale of a physical input. In the
bike pedal example, if the designer were also the only
component manufacturer, the quantities of bikes sold in the
32. For example, Alan W. Beggs, The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric
Information, 10 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 171 (1992) and I. MACHO-STADLER & D.
PEREZ-CASTILLO, AN INTRODUCTION To THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION:
INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS (Oxford University Press 2001) study models
where the innovator uses a combination of royalties and fees to separate
licensees with different cost reductions. Other papers show that royalties can
be a signal of the quality of the innovation: Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright,
Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information, 21 RAND J. ECON. 147
(1990); or that royalties can be a response to the existence of moral hazard: Jay
Pil Choi, Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard, 19 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 249
(2001) and Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: the
Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001). The
specification of royalties can also be dictated by risk-sharing purposes. See
Alain Bouquet, Helmuth Cremer, Marc Ivaldi & Michel Wolkowicz, Risk
Sharing in Licensing, 16 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 535 (1998).
33. See, e.g., Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, Fees Versus Royalties and
the Private Value of a Patent, 101 Q. J. ECoN. 471 (1986); Morton I. Kamien &
Yair Tauman, Patent Licensing: The Inside Story, 70 THE MANCHESTER SCH. 7
(2002); Josh Lerner & Anne Layne-Farrar, Valuing Patents for Licensing: A
Practical Survey of the Literature (Working Paper 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1440292. Note that fixed
per-unit dollar amounts can lower a licensee's cost uncertainty in the short run,
whereas in markets where prices tend to fall over time, in the longer term such
licensing schemes tend to lead to royalty rates that are disproportionately high
in relation to the end product price.
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final market would be easily inferred from the number of
pedals sold in the wholesale component market. Once the
pedal designer chooses not to manufacture the pedal itself,
but instead to license its intellectual property to an upstream
(pedal) manufacturer, the designer loses control and visibility
over the number of units sold.
When private information is held by licensees, such as
the actual number of goods sold incorporating the IPR, the
IPR holder may want the flexibility to contract with multiple
layers in the production chain. The IPR holder could then
charge each link a partial fee that aggregates into an
equivalent amount to the one that would have maintained
had only one production level been licensed. Several factors
support such licensing flexibility: monitoring costs, license
enforcement costs, licensee incentives for under-reporting,
and uncertainty regarding demand.
Monitoring is an issue when the relevant quantity sold is
not easy for an IPR holder to verify. Initially, the IPR holder
must decide the particular products to monitor. Frequently,
it is difficult to identify the exact goods that a patent license
covers. Manufacturers in high technology sectors often sell a
wide variety of similar yet different products. For example,
goods that incorporate multiple semiconductor chips tend to
rely on hundreds, if not thousands, of patents. 34  For
copyright, software provides a good example. Most
commercial programs contain millions of lines of code, so
determining whether a particular program infringes on
another software producer's copyrighted code is quite
difficult. In cases of this sort, determining the products that
do and the products that do not incorporate the licensed IP
can be difficult; furthermore, this determination is often
subjective.
Once the products dependent on the IPR are determined,
the IPR holder needs to monitor the sale of those products.
Even with established licensing relationships, for many
technology products that are shipped globally, the sale of
intermediate components is difficult to monitor. In fact, due
34. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 1, 121 n.3 (Adam
Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., MIT Press 2001) ("Nearly 5000 patents
were granted in the U.S. in a recent single year, 1998, relating to
'microprocessors' alone, not to mention semiconductors more broadly.").
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to the difficulty of monitoring, many firms have implemented
licensing tracking systems for individual units (or boxes)
being sold and shipped. For example, one firm instituted a
special license aimed directly at the unreported sales
problem: under this contract, a box containing components
relying on the patented technology can only be shipped if
proof of the license is displayed on the outside of the box.15
Monitoring costs also explain the blanket licensing for
copyrighted music, since determining the various licenses
covering particular songs played by a radio station, and how
many times those songs are played, would require
exorbitantly expensive monitoring.3 6
If monitoring licensee sales is costly for IPR holders, it
makes sense to concentrate the monitoring effort on the
production level, where this cost is lowest. The cost of
monitoring a particular level of production might be different
depending on the number of firms and the level of
competition in the marketplace, or the closeness of the
production stage to the final consumer. In particular, in
markets where upstream prices are obtained as the result of
private negotiations, but downstream prices are posted and
publicly available, monitoring will be easier in the last stage
of production.37
Monitoring costs suggest that even if IPR holders license
only one level of the production process, they should have the
freedom to select the best level. On the other hand, when
multiple production layers exist, licensing more than one
level can provide several check points for verifying quantities
sold, yielding the IPR holder with improved information on
the downstream marketplace to correct for problems of
35. The per-batch licensing system was introduced by Philips (dubbing the
program VEEZA) in place of its previous CD-R Disc Patent License Agreements.
With VEEZA, a separate license is obtained for each shipment. The shipments
are marked with a unique code signaling to the traders and retailers that the
merchandise is licensed. See Philips Intellectual Property & Standards,
Licensing, IP.PHILIPS.cOM, https://www.ip.philips.com/services/?module=IpsLice
nseProgram&command=View&id=20&part=7 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
36. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 662, 662 (1983).
37. For instance, a patent holder with patents on gasoline processing
procedures can rely on the publicly posted prices for gasoline in the energy
market. In contrast, a patent holder with a patent on, say, a drug delivery
patch will not have reference to any public price lists for the delivery
mechanism. In this case, only the final product price will be observable.
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private information. In these cases, splitting fees across
production layers can allow an IPR holder to obtain
additional estimates of the quantity sold that complement the
direct observation gathered through the level chosen for
monitoring.
Likewise, license enforcement costs can affect an IPR
holder's decision of which production levels to license. If the
cost of enforcing a license differs across levels of the
production process, the patent holder may prefer to shift or
spread the allocation of the royalty burden. In case of a
dispute, say because the licensee refuses to fulfill its payment
obligations, the patent holder has different leverage
depending on the characteristics of the licensee. Injunctions
might be more effective against those firms whose product
that incorporates the patent is highly profitable. This threat
alone might be enough to allow the proper enforcement of the
licensing contract. As a result, when enforcement is an
important concern, the patent holder may want to shift the
royalty burden towards those stages of production where
competition is weaker and the licensee's profit margin is
higher. In technology markets, these high-margin stages are
often the ones closest to the final consumer, where product
differentiation and brand reputation can make competition
less fierce.
Licensee incentives to underreport product sales, thereby
shrinking their royalty base and lowering their royalty
payments, also can push patent holders to license at multiple
stages of the production chain. This follows because the lower
individual rates that result when multiple layers are licensed
can reduce licensees' incentives to underreport the payments
owed: less money is at stake so the incentive to misrepresent
sales is lower. Recall from the idealized world discussion
above that cost pass-through constrains the aggregate royalty
payments the IPR holder receives. Frictions in cost pass-
through are discussed in more detail below, but suffice it to
say here that as long as some pass-through of royalty costs is
likely, charging multiple levels implies lower royalty rates for
any given level than if only one production level is licensed.
Lower royalty rates at each stage can increase the odds of
obtaining accurate information on the quantity of goods sold
downstream (i.e., reduce the incentives for licensees to
underreport).
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Finally, information uncertainty can play a role as well.
For example, placing the entire royalty burden on the first
level of the production chain may be infeasible if it is difficult
to forecast the ultimate downstream market demand at the
time the upstream firm's license needs to be signed." In
those situations, the upstream manufacturer will have
difficulty determining the appropriate wholesale price so as to
pass on the correct royalty burden to the next level in the
production chain. Splitting the royalty burden across
production levels can help to spread the risk of demand
uncertainty more evenly across market players. Moreover,
timing might matter as well if negotiations with downstream
producers, selling goods into the end market, can take place
at a later date. At that point, the downstream firm better
knows its needs, whereas at the time of negotiations with the
upstream producer the downstream production needs would
have to be estimated.
The difficulties introduced by uncertainty and private
information therefore suggest a positive role for multiple-level
patent licensing under certain circumstances. In those cases,
the ability to relax the strict application of the first sale
doctrine can lead to more efficient contracts by providing the
patent holder with additional information on downstream
sales or with easier contract enforcement.
Thus, while the first sale doctrine played no role, positive
or negative, in the ideal frictionless world that this paper
initially considered, in the presence of information frictions, a
strict application of the first sale doctrine to patent licensing
across production levels actually can be harmful. Some
frictions suggest that single-level licensing is best (e.g.,
finding the lowest cost monitoring environment or the
marketplace that best facilitates license enforcement), but
other frictions indicate that multiple level licensing can be
quite important (e.g., collecting royalty base information from
multiple points to improve overall demand information or
lowering licensees' incentives to underreport relevant sales).
Accordingly, preventing firms within a production chain from
38. As LG Electronics argued in the case, "petitioners' [Quanta's] approach
would demand that the full and final value of these patents be determined at a
single point in the distribution chain, where the relevant information simply
does not exist." Brief of Respondent at 32, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937).
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contracting around patent exhaustion in circumstances where
it makes sense to do so will increase the likelihood of
underreporting for certain patent holders. As a result,
information frictions provide an economic justification for
flexibility in contracting around patent exhaustion (before the
final good is sold to the end consumer).
B. Extending the Logic Beyond Patents
As already noted, the production of copyrighted goods
and artwork often does not involve multiple production
layers. What, then, does the introduction of information
frictions imply for relaxing the first sale doctrine for these
IPRs?
For digital copyright, some of the most important
information frictions relate to the monitoring of copies and
the enforcement of the license contract. In fact, the
prevalence of online piracy has been a key motivation in the
creation of digital rights management schemes." Recall that
end buyers of online copyrighted works do not face the
transaction costs that offline end buyers do (such as the costs
associated with creating and distributing physical copies). As
a result, proponents of DRM argue that the rights themselves
must be adjusted because otherwise the incentive structure
created by the grant of a copyright will be completely
eviscerated by the technological realities of today's
marketplace.4 0 Hence, imposition of restrictions that affect
first sale-such as the imposition of time limits on the use of
a copyrighted work and the prevention of any resale of the
work-can be justified, under this view, as resetting the
original balance of seller-buyer rights achieved through
copyright law offline.4 1
On the other side of the argument, there is the potential
for very different degrees of knowledge, information
asymmetry, and understanding between copyright sellers and
39. See Bach, supra note 6.
40. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 34-35.
41. Of course, not all DRM claw-backs can be justified on these grounds.
Just as technology permits copyright buyers to share copies widely, enabling
friends to avoid the purchase price, so too does technology lead to abuses by
rights holders who impose restrictions simply because they can. For a
discussion of the abuses of DRM, such as using DRM to violate private rights,
see Richard Watt, The Past and the Future of the Economics of Copyright, 1
REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 151, 164 (2004).
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buyers. Unlike the above discussion of multilevel patent
licensing, where a business entity is on each side of the
negotiation table, oftentimes copyright transactions are
business-to-consumer. For negotiations over a blanket license
to play a catalog of music between ASCAP (American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers) and a large
department store chain, for instance, we do not need to worry
as much about the disparate sophistication of the parties. On
the other hand, disparate sophistication becomes relevant
when considering a consumer's purchase of an e-book or
downloadable song.
Concern regarding certainty over the end price and the
rights conveyed to consumers are likely to give us greater
pause when considering whether first sale can be relaxed
contractually for the sale of copyrighted goods. But even in
the real world where information frictions are an everyday
issue, we may still find some, albeit relatively narrow,
situations where allowing for such relaxation makes sense.
Consider the sale of software and music over the internet.
Over the past few decades, so-called "click wrap" licenses 42
have become quite common, given how easily sellers can now
impose them.4 3 It might be reasonable to assume that
consumers are now familiar enough with these forms of
contracts to allow copyright holders to sell certain restricted-
rights products, like e-books that can be read only on one
form of digital reader and cannot be copied to multiple
devices.
With click wrap licensing, if the copyright holder
provides adequate notice of the restriction on rights that end
users would not otherwise expect, consumers may actually
benefit from the restriction by receiving more information
about the grant of rights. In particular, in this instance
contractual flexibility regarding first sale doctrine could
provide consumers with a broader range of available products
42. A click wrap license is an online license where the terms and conditions
of the license require the purchaser to click on an "I agree" or an "I accept these
terms and conditions" button before consummating an online sale. See, e.g.,
Francis M. Brono & Jonathan A. Friedman, Maximizing the Enforceability of
Click-Wrap Agreements, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3 (1999).
43. Patrick J. Mondi, I Accept the Terms in the Agreement: Market Efficiency
in Clickwrap Agreements and Open Source Software, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV.
540, 546 (2007).
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at a broader range of prices.4 4 If consumers can make an
informed tradeoff between more rights (the ability to copy the
work to another personal device, for instance) for more
money, overall consumer welfare could be higher. Consumers
with marginal valuations for the right to make digital copies
for other devices may purchase an online copyrighted good
with restricted rights that is offered at a discount when they
would not have purchased the same copyrighted product with
fuller rights for a higher price. In this case, the ability to
impose restrictions broadens consumer choice in the overall
market.
A similar careful regard toward end users, and their
ability to learn of and understand the rights conveyed by the
seller, would apply in regards to works of art for the DDS
rule. The most relevant of the information frictions in this
instance is primarily mutual uncertainty, rather than any
privately held knowledge by one or the other party. With new
artistic works, paintings, sculptures, etc., it will often be the
case that neither party knows how strong the ultimate
demand for the artist's work will be at some later point in
time when the current work may be resold. In fact, many
works of art never become popular enough to have a resale
market at all.45 The ultimate popularity of an artist's works
is also influenced by that artist's actions. Indeed, the mere
act of making multiple works that are similar to one another
in form can lower the price of any one work. Moreover, it is
likely that even in those jurisdictions where a DDS rule is in
force, it is irrelevant for the vast majority of artwork, as the
pieces will never be resold or the DDS rule will not be actively
enforced.
Uncertainty over ultimate popularity was a particular
motivation for the introduction of the DDS rule over works of
art. 6 At the time of the initial sale, an artist might be young
44. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
45. See John Solow, An Economic Analysis of the Droit de Suite, 22 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 209, 210 (1998).
46. Id. at 211.
[This paper] focuses on the decision to produce at different points in
time; the resale price of a piece of art will depend on the prices of
substitutes and complements including, in all likelihood, later works by
the artist. The key insight is that the residual interest in early works
provided by the resale royalty gives the artist an incentive to maintain
the value of those works that is absent without the royalty.
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and relatively unknown; when the work is resold at a later
point in time, the market value of the work is more likely to
be established. Hence, a regime where the creator receives
an additional royalty payment at the time of resale can
provide better incentives for the creation of new works in the
first instance, can create incentives for an artist to cultivate
and maintain demand for his or her creations, can moderate
the production of near-copies, and can better ensure an
economically appropriate return for the IPR holder.
In the creation of these incentives, DDS is analogous to
the use of royalties for patent licensing. In particular,
splitting the total payment for a given work between today's
price and tomorrow's (potential) royalty allows the artist and
the buyer to share some of the risk involved in trading works
of art. If the buyer anticipates little to no aftermarket for an
artist's work, then no royalty payments will be expected and
the current price will reflect the full value assessed. If, on the
other hand, the buyer expects the work of art to be popular in
the future, to be eligible for resale, and anticipates that DDS
will be enforced, then the buyer will pay a lower price today
reflecting the present value of the later royalty payment. If
the work is more popular than anticipated, the artist will
receive a windfall in actual royalty payments exceeding their
forecasted amount at the time of the original sale. If, on the
other hand, resale values do not materialize as anticipated,
the artist will be undercompensated because later royalty
payments will fall short of the original price offset. To the
extent that an artist can control (or more realistically,
contribute to) the future demand for her own works, say by
giving more shows or promoting her work at galleries and on
the Internet, DDS may help to align incentives and give
artists financial reasons for making such efforts at
promotion.47
However, any positive forces for risk sharing and
incentives to maintain market value would have to be
weighed against the costs imposed on buyers of artwork. As
with copyright, art buyers would need to fully understand the
Id.
47. Id. at 210 (citing Larry Karp & Jeffrey Perloff, Legal Requirements that
Artists Receive Resale Royalties, 13 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 163 (2003)).
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DDS legal regime regulating the sale of artworks in order to
properly assess prices, of both today and tomorrow.
C. The Importance of Cost Pass-Through Frictions in
Downstream Licensing
The discussion, thus far, has highlighted the important
role that information plays in efficient licensing. We have
largely assumed that the various manufacturing firms pass
costs through to their custqmers in setting wholesale prices,
providing a link between upstream and downstream markets.
How does the analysis change if frictions in the marketplace
limit cost pass-through? What if technological or institutional
constraints prevent wholesale prices from fully adjusting to
changes in the royalties?
Consider an extreme case where the upstream
manufacturer has no control over price setting at all. In this
environment, the wholesale component price will be
exogenously determined and no pass-through will be possible.
Thus, when the IPR holder implements different ways to split
the total royalty, the allocations could affect end markets and
IPR royalty revenue could differ in the aggregate as well as in
the components. Zero cost pass-through on the part of
manufacturers is, however, just as unrealistic as the absence
of all frictions or transaction costs. More realistically,
component manufacturers facing pricing frictions will be able
to pass some, but not all, cost increases through to their
customers.48
In the case where cost pass-through is partial, suppose
the patent holder attempts to charge the full royalty burden
on the upstream component maker. The upstream
manufacturer-knowing that it cannot recoup the royalty
expense applicable downstream because it cannot adjust the
wholesale price to fully reflect the cost increase resulting from
the royalty charge-will negotiate with the IPR holder with
its own profit margin in mind. Unless the licensee has no
bargaining power at all (such as after irreversible
investments are made), it is likely that the resulting royalty
rate will equal (or be close to) the partial rate reflecting the
value of the patent to the upstream production process that
48. See DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 254 (Addison Wesley 2004).
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would have resulted in the frictionless world with full pass-
through. This means, once again, that the patent holder
cannot double dip in multilevel production licensing. The IPR
holder will therefore need to license the downstream
manufacturer, as well as the upstream one, in order to obtain
the full economic return on its IPR.
Note that the derived demand constraint discussed
earlier may be limited when the upstream firm cannot fully
pass through any royalty burden in the wholesale price.
Restricted pass-through attenuates the link to end consumer
demand, demand that previously acted to moderate the
aggregate royalties assessed by the patent holder. The patent
holder may be able, if it holds sufficient bargaining power
(e.g., ex post licensing), to increase its total royalty earnings
as compared to the frictionless full pass-through
environment. Even with ex post licensing, however, the
patent holder would still need to be mindful of a licensee's
incentives to reduce its supply in the components market. In
practice, this could lead to an equivalent result as full cost
pass-through, or lead the component manufacturer to work
around the patent, reducing royalty income to zero. Suppose,
though, that neither of those constraints for the component
supplier was substantial, so that the patent holder could
indeed double dip to some extent, in the sense of increasing
its aggregate royalty income by licensing multiple production
levels as compared to licensing a single level.49
Still, this scenario would not match the complaints raised
during the Quanta case because those arguments hinged on
pass-through that harmed end consumers. Here, on the other
hand, as long as some pass-through to consumers is possible,
the downstream royalty would be set with end consumer
demand in mind, just as with single level licensing, because
that is how the patent holder maximizes its royalty revenues
on the downstream layer of production. The additional
royalty income would derive from bargaining power in
licensing the upstream firm as well as the downstream firm.
However, the limited cost pass-through implies that any
additional royalty income above the single level amount is a
firm-to-firm transfer of profits from the upstream
49. As before, multilevel licensing is restricted to business-to-business
negotiations and does not include end consumers.
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manufacturer to the patent holder; consumers would not be
harmed.s0 As it appears, in most instances patent holders are
under-compensated." Even if a patent holder could earn
more with multi-layer licensing, such a licensing scheme may
still not translate into over-compensation. End consumers
would only be harmed to the extent that end prices rise as a
result of pass-through; but, if costs are passed through then
we are back in the frictionless world where double dipping is
not profit maximizing for patent holders, and thus not
practiced.
Double dipping, in those instances where it is possible, is
a special instance of patent holdup. It is difficult to see why
the doctrine of patent exhaustion, however, is the best
solution for dealing with this narrow subset of patent holdup.
First, since consumer welfare is not affected, a clear case
would need to be made that social welfare was harmed, say
through detrimental effects on innovation or industry
investment incentives, before any government or court
intervention is warranted. Moreover, the harm identified
from double dipping would need to outweigh the benefits of
contracting around patent exhaustion, as discussed above.
While we might have "fairness" objections to one firm having
the ability to exploit another at the bargaining table, we
should bear in mind that pricing exploitations happen with
regularity throughout the economy. These exploitations are
by no means limited to IPR licensing and other more general
forms of law (contract, fair business practices, etc.) are
available for dealing with the egregious cases. It is unclear
what patent exhaustion has to offer that these other legal
doctrines cannot deal with already, especially in light of the
collateral damage that could occur from restricting firms'
ability to contract around exhaustion in business-to-business
dealings.
50. Recall that any relaxation of patent exhaustion would apply only in
firm-to-firm negotiations and royalties would not be charged at the end
consumer level. Note also, that even with limited pass-through of costs,
upstream firms will not agree to a royalty in excess of the value they receive
unless the license negotiation takes place ex post, when irreversible
investments can be exploited, or when they have no bargaining power for some
other reason. I discuss ex post licensing below. See infra Part IV.
51. See Vincenzo Denicolb, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22
ECON. POL'Y 679 (2007).
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As another example of cost pass-through frictions,
consider the case where a single upstream producer sells to
several downstream firms in different market niches such
that the same component input has a different added value.
This would be the case, for example, if the same
semiconductor chip were incorporated in mobile phones,
external USB modems, and certain laptop computers. In this
case, complete cost pass-through would mean that the profits
for all parties would be the same regardless of whether the
patent holder charges a royalty upstream and (possibly)
different royalties downstream, or if it charges the full royalty
upstream and the upstream producer modifies the price of the
intermediate product appropriately to pass the royalty cost
along to each (differentiated) downstream producer.
Suppose once again, however, due to arbitrage or
antitrust cautions, that the upstream component
manufacturer is unable to pass on all of its costs. In this
case, the strict application of the exhaustion doctrine could
make it difficult or impossible for the patent holder to achieve
the economically justified return on its IPR, or to ensure
licensing efficiency. Suppose the patent holder only licenses
the upstream firm. If the patent holder charges the royalty
dictated by the highest value use of its IPR (say the mobile
phone handsets in the example above), that rate will be too
high for the component maker to make sales to any lower
valuation uses (like USB modems). In this case, the
component maker will choose not to serve the lower value
downstream market at all, and will instead opt to keep
royalty costs at a reasonable level so as to maintain overall
profits. Alternatively, if the patent holder sets the royalty
rate according to the lowest value use of the IPR, it is simply
transferring its profits to the component maker, who will
pocket the difference on any sales made to the higher value
users. Hence, if licensing is to occur at the upstream level,
the patent holder must be able to discriminate amongst the
downstream production uses. This requires the ability to
restrict uses of the IPR and requires accurate reporting of the
division of uses on the part of the licensee. If, due to
monitoring imperfections, such discriminatory pricing is not
workable, the patent holder will be under-compensated,
reducing its incentives to license in the first place, or lower
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value downstream markets will not be served, to the
detriment of end consumers.
The way around these problems is for the patent holder
to license the downstream markets directly, ignoring the
upstream level. In this case, royalty rates can be tailored to
the corresponding valuation of the IPR in any given
downstream market. While this might appear to be an easy
solution, preserving the exhaustion doctrine and avoiding
problems that stem from an inability of upstream producers
to fully pass costs through to the next level of the production
chain, that conclusion relies on the absence of any other
frictions. As discussed earlier, information asymmetries may
indicate licensing upstream is the best approach, but cost
pass-through limits may prevent that. In other words, when
both kinds of frictions are present, multiple production-level
licensing may be the best solution to minimize all concerns.
Similar forces may be at play in copyright licensing,
although these cases are less frequent because there are
fewer instances of multilevel production relevant for
copyright. As one example, it is reasonable to expect that
some software modules will find multiple applications for
embedding in products downstream. In this case, where the
buyer and seller are both businesses, it can make sense for
copyright holders to limit resale-for example, to prevent
arbitrage from a low value/low licensing fee market toward a
higher value/higher licensing fee market.
The fundamental result is that in the face of transaction
costs, it can be important to allow IPR holders the flexibility
to license multiple parties and place certain contractual
restrictions on the buyer's rights. Charging just one versus
charging multiple parties is not the pivotal element for social
welfare. In fact, in the presence of marketplace frictions, the
way the total licensing burden is split among (business-to-
business) licensees is likely to reflect the cheapest and most
convenient way to implement licensing, and this split is
bound to differ across firms, industries, and sectors of the
economy. In other words, charging multiple firm levels might
be crucial to maintaining both economically justified rewards
and efficient licensing.
Thus, the analysis presented here suggests that, in many
circumstances, strictly applying the patent exhaustion
doctrine in business exchanges could create economic
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inefficiencies. Moreover, in some circumstances with
copyright and DDS, relaxing first sale can actually be
beneficial to end buyers. While it is clear that one of the
benefits stemming from the patent exhaustion or first sale
doctrine is the certainty that later users of a product will not
be sought after for a license, if this was an important risk in
business-to-business transactions it could easily be addressed
by using first sale as the presumed or "default" (but not
mandatory) rule. In that case, first sale would be overturned
through explicit clauses of IPR licensing, giving proper notice
to buyers, when other concerns were of greater importance. If
a patent license contract to a firm did not specify limitations
or any subset of rights that are not passed through to the
licensee's customers, then first sale would apply; otherwise, it
would not. For other IPR, end user notice would need to be
clear and accessible, and the rights holder would need to
provide an economic rationale for the restriction (such as
offering lower priced products to expand consumer choice) to
ensure that the practice was not abusive. As explored above,
it is certainly possible that such justifications could be made.
IV. COMPETITION CONCERNS RELATED TO MULTI-PARTY
LICENSING
Based on a reading of the various amici briefs in the
Quanta case,5 2 the primary competition concern at issue with
the patent exhaustion doctrine appears to be double dipping,
or "excessive" royalty earnings by the IPR holder. Other
potential concerns that emerge from the analysis presented in
this paper are: (1) "double marginalization," where the
presence of multiple levels of production increases end-
market prices above even the monopolistic level; (2) "royalty
stacking," where multiple patent licenses can stack upon one
another to create a very high aggregate licensing cost for
manufacturers; and (3) raising rivals costs, where a vertically
integrated IPR holder could use licensing rates to reduce
52. Brief of Dell Inc., Hewlett-Packard, Co. & Gateway, Inc. as Amici Curiae
In Support of Petitioners at 12, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937) ("Allowing the patent owner to multiply its
recovery by extracting a new, duplicative royalty at each stage of ownership
does not promote the progress of science and the useful arts and thus does not
serve the purposes of the patent system.").
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downstream competition. In this section, I consider each of
these concerns in turn.
A. Double Dipping
As explained above, in a frictionless world, double
dipping is not possible in multilevel licensing; intermediate
firms will simply adjust wholesale prices to pass on any
royalty costs, so that end-market suppliers bear the full
royalty burden whether it is charged to them directly or not.
In a world with limits on the ability of intermediate
manufacturers to pass through costs, some double dipping
may be possible, but in that case it represents a transfer
between firms, not a transfer from consumers to producers.
Thus, the concern is not realized.
The key factor providing the avoidance of double dipping
is the ability of the parties to contract ex ante, before
potential licensees have made any sunk investments. During
ex post negotiations, if such irreversible investments have
been made, then multiple licenses may indeed double dip, but
a better name for this behavior is patent hold up. In other
words, as already noted, double dipping is really only a
special, rather narrow, case of ex post extortion that is only
possible when downstream firms have a good in the market
before a license on the IPR that good relies upon is agreed.
The patent exhaustion doctrine is irrelevant in this instance:
irreversible investments can be exploited at one level of
production or at many levels. Thus, a strict application of
exhaustion is not an effective means of preventing such
opportunistic licensing, as the ability to hold up licensees
hinges on the presence of irreversible investments, ex post
negotiations, and asymmetric bargaining power, and does not
rely on an ability to license multiple parties in the production
chain.
A variant of double dipping has also been expressed as a
concern over DDS rules. For example, some authors have
raised the theoretical concern that DDS rules might reward
authors in the phase of their careers when they are relatively
less productive and might also distort the market by diverting
artworks from DDS-friendly countries towards those
jurisdictions where artists do not receive such additional
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royalties.sa In contrast, applying the analysis presented here
to DDS rules implies that if uncertainty is not large, the
prices initially paid to an artist would adjust to reflect
expected DDS payments made in the future. Moreover, as
explained above, DDS may increase an artist's incentives to
maintain the market value of his works.
In the face of dueling theories, the matter must be
resolved empirically, and quantitative studies of DDS rules
indicate that the ex post royalty does not create inefficiencies.
While, short of a large-scale survey, there is no way of
knowing whether DDS does or does not improve artists'
incentives to maintain the future value of their works, the
evidence presented in economic literature shows that the
impact on future prices for artwork covered by DDS is
negligible, as are any trading volume effects.5 4 If anything,
the quantitative studies indicate that trading volume
increases in DDS-friendly countries as compared to countries
without DDS rules. This makes sense if DDS works to
motivate artists to expend effort to maintain their
reputations and the value of their works of art over the
artist's lifetime. 5
B. Double Marginalization
The other "double" problem that emerges in the analysis
above is double marginalization.5" This issue arises when
firms at multiple levels of the production process each want to
charge a profit margin on their portion of the sale. As the
good works its way toward the final market the margins stack
over production levels, raising end consumer prices. In fact,
industries characterized by double marginalization tend to
have prices that exceed the monopoly price level.
One might suppose that the presence of double
marginalization would suggest that the IPR holder charges
all of the royalty downstream, lest it increase margins at both
53. See Ginsburgh, supra note 9, at 68-69.
54. See, e.g., Kathryn Graddy & Chanont Banternghansa, The Impact of the
Droit de Suite in the UK: An Empirical Analysis 1 (CEPR Discussion Paper No.
DP7136, 2009).
55. Or, alternatively, these results are as expected if we believe that DDS
rules are not actively enforced.
56. For a discussion of the economics of double marginalization, see W. KIP
VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST, 221-23 (MIT Press 2000).
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production levels and hence exacerbate double
marginalization. As it turns out, however, this conjecture is
not accurate, since with any degree of cost pass-through the
intermediate wholesale price charged by upstream
manufacturers will adjust as the upstream royalty rate
changes. So, just as with double dipping, double
marginalization distortions are unrelated to the first sale
doctrine. Instead, such problems derive solely from the
presence of various production levels in an industry, and from
the relationship between the firms active at those levels."7
Note that patent licensing could actually undo the
problems of double marginalization if the IPR holder were
able to charge an unorthodox two-part tariff consisting of a
negative royalty rate and an upfront fixed fee. Specifically,
an IPR holder could extract an economically justifiable return
through the imposition of a fixed license fee that does not
affect any of the producer firms' marginal quantity
decisions."8 The IPR holder could then undo the double
marginalization arising from the relationship between the
upstream and the downstream producers by charging a
negative royalty rate upstream. 9 If this were possible, it
would lead the downstream firm to charge the monopoly
price, a price lower than that under double marginalization.
By lowering the downstream producer's costs (and hence its
prices), this licensing regime would result in higher
downstream quantities sold. In this case, the upstream
producer would be compensated for its inability to charge a
profit margin through the receipt of the negative royalty rate
transfer payment from the IPR holder. The IPR holder would
be compensated for the transfer to the upstream producer as
57. With vertical integration, one entity controls the full production process.
Even if subsidiaries and affiliates are involved, there is still some level of
centralized control that will internalize pricing issues.
58. Indeed, early economic analysis predicted that all or most patent
licenses should involve lump sum payments so as not to distort licensee's
marginal production decisions. In the absence of any uncertainty, such
payments are more economically efficient. See, e.g., Morton I. Kamien, Patent
Licensing, in HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 347
(Robert J. Aumann & Sergio Hart eds., 1992) ("[Tjhe patentee's licensing profits
are higher if he auctions licenses than if he employs a royalty, except if the
invention is drastic or the industry is perfectly competitive.").
59. That is, the patent holder would charge a "normal" royalty to the
downstream producer, but would pay the upstream producer (transferring funds
from the downstream producer) rather than charging it a royalty.
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well as the value of its IPR through the fixed fees charged
downstream. While this approach is theoretically possible,
the ability to charge negative royalty rates seems highly
unrealistic at best, making this option little more than a
hypothetical thought exercise.
C. Royalty Stacking is a Separate Issue
Yet another complaint frequently raised by patent
licensees is the issue of royalty stacking.o While double
marginalization involves the "stacking" of royalties over
vertical layers of production, under royalty stacking, the
concern is a horizontal one: the presence of multiple patent
holders that all charge royalties to the same licensee.
Clearly, the problem of royalty stacking does not necessarily
involve licenses at multiple production levels. Nonetheless,
royalty stacking might still be relevant for patent exhaustion
in multilevel production industries.
Consider an industry with two production levels and
numerous upstream patent holders. Just as in one of the
scenarios discussed above, the many patent holders could
license just the upstream producers, who would then pass
through full rights to the downstream firms to complete the
good's production for sale to end users. Alternatively, the
patent holders could split the rights across levels, charging a
lower rate to the upstream firms, but not allowing the pass
through of full rights so the downstream firms would need
licenses as well. Downstream firms could have one of two
preferences in this scenario. They might prefer that the
upstream firms acquire full pass through rights, so the
downstream firms do not need to directly pay any licensing
fees. Upstream firms might reasonably charge a premium for
this service, since they would take on all of the coordination
costs and would be providing their customers with complete
input cost certainty. This certainty is especially important
when there is ambiguity over the set of patents reading on
the downstream product. Alternatively, some downstream
firms might prefer to pay a lower price to the wholesaler for
just the input, acquiring any patent rights they might need
through their own direct negotiations. If downstream firms
60. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX L. REv. 1991 (2007).
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believed they did not need licenses to the full set of upstream
patents, or if they felt they were in a stronger bargaining
position than the upstream component supplier, they might
prefer this route. It would involve increased transaction
costs, as the downstream firm would need to negotiate patent
licenses on its own, but it may lower the aggregate royalty
payments the firm had to make.
The scenario likely to be more prevalent in any given
industry is an empirical matter that we have little
information about, given the confidential nature of firms'
patent negotiations. Here, the point is that allowing
flexibility to contract around patent exhaustion allows an
efficient market outcome to emerge, without courts needing to
guess at the particular set of preferences firms may have.
Thus, even in the presence of potential royalty stacking, it is
economically efficient to allow for the option to contract
around patent exhaustion.
D. Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Depend On Multi-Level
Licensing
The final potential competition concern relates to raising
rivals' costs. Suppose that the upstream producer also offers
a substitute good to the one sold by the downstream firm. It
is a well-known concern that an integrated firm with an
upstream presence might raise the price of its input
component as a way of increasing the downstream firm's costs
and hence its prices. This is a means for relaxing
downstream competition and increasing the sale of the
integrated suppliers' substitute product.1
While this dynamic might raise the wholesale price that
the integrated firm charges for input components, the royalty
rates charged by the IPR holder would not play any role in
that decision. Even when the IPR holder charges a different
combination of royalties up and downstream, with some
degree of cost pass-through, the upstream manufacturer will
respond by changing the wholesale price, leaving the total
input cost for the final product roughly unchanged. As a
61. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs", 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 95 (1988); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffiman, Raising
Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); David S. Sibley & Dennis L.
Weisman, Raising Rivals' Costs: The Entry of an Upstream Monopolist Into
Downstream Markets, 10 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 451 (1998).
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result, the application of the first sale doctrine is not at issue
in markets where upstream manufacturers are vertically
integrated and there are a number of downstream
competitors.
Alternatively, suppose that it is the IPR holder that is
vertically integrated into downstream production. In this
case, the royalty rate might be used as a vehicle for disguising
a raising-rivals'-cost scheme.62  That being said, if the IPR
holder has sufficient market power to raise the royalty rate to
its downstream competitors in this fashion, presumably the
patent holder could also simply raise its component wholesale
price. The only instance where the royalty rate might offer
the only vehicle for raising rivals' costs would occur when the
intermediate components were supplied competitively while
the IPR was not (i.e., the IPR had no viable substitutes). In
this case, downstream producers could obtain their inputs
from a rival upstream component supplier to the IPR holder.
Under this circumstance, the patent holder would
intentionally set the royalty rate above the level that was
optimal for maximizing its IPR licensing profits in order to
soften downstream competition in the goods market so as to
earn a greater share of product sales for itself. In other
words, the patent holder would set the royalty rate to
maximize profits from the sale of goods, not from the
licensing program in isolation. But in either of these cases,
where the patent holder is vertically integrated, licensing
multiple levels is not necessary to accomplish the raising-
rivals'-costs strategy: the IPR holder can simply license the
level of production where it directly competes, ignoring any
other levels of production.
Thus, none of the above possible competition concerns
within multiple level production turn on the application of the
patent exhaustion doctrine. While double dipping, double
marginalization, royalty stacking, and raising rivals' costs are
all serious concerns with antitrust implications, none of them
depend on an IPR holder's ability to charge royalties at
multiple layers of the production chain. Instead, it is other
factors, like the presence of irreversible investments that can
62. Because IPR is much harder to value than tangible goods, it will be
more difficult for licensees and competition authorities to identify overpriced
IPR meant to raise a rival's costs.
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be exploited or the existence of vertical integration, that
enable these opportunistic behaviors.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented in this paper has focused on the
economics of patent licensing in a complex industrial
environment, with a less detailed examination of copyright
licensing and artwork sales under DDS. In an idealized
setting, with no transaction costs or asymmetries of
information, application of the patent exhaustion doctrine
(either strictly or with flexibility) within a multilevel
production setting has no impact on social welfare.
Essentially, it is irrelevant for setting aggregate royalties, for
determining final market prices, or for the quantities sold.
Charging just one (versus multiple) firms along the
production chain is not the pivotal element for social welfare.
Considering an idealized world, with no frictions or
transaction costs, is a useful thought experiment because it
clarifies the relevant dynamic competition factors and
provides a meaningful benchmark case. That being said, to
understand real world licensing, one must add the real
frictions and transaction costs into the analysis. For
instance, many industries are likely to be characterized by
private information, uncertainty over product demand, or
wholesale input pricing constraints. Even in this more
complicated and more realistic world, though, there is no
justification for placing absolute restrictions on the ability of
IPR holders to split fees among multiple production layers.
In fact, in the face of transaction costs and frictions, a strict
interpretation of the patent exhaustion doctrine is likely to
generate welfare losses in the economically justified reward
and efficiency dimensions of licensing."
In light of the realistic scenarios where the ability to
contract around exhaustion is important, a flexible approach
to the doctrine's application is warranted on the basis of
economic efficiency. Certainly not all circumstances will call
for multilevel (or across-time, for copyright) licensing.
Indeed, single level licensing can be more economically
efficient.' But, when circumstances call for multilevel
63. See supra Part III.B.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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licensing-for instance, when royalty base monitoring can be
improved by obtaining output reports from multiple
production points or when sharing the royalty burden across
production levels reduces licensees' incentives to underreport
their relevant sales-firms should have the freedom to
contract around first sale. This ability to contract around
first sale must be paired with the certainty that a court will
not undo the contract at some later point in time.
Certainly one of the key concerns raised in the Quanta
case, that a patent holder charging royalties at multiple
layers of the production process could be engaged in double
dipping, appears to be misplaced. In actuality, this concern
will only apply under very narrow circumstances, and it will
not have a direct consumer welfare impact in any event.
Certainly with business-to-business negotiations, the main
motivation of providing pricing certainty appears to be far
less important, as the parties are likely to be sophisticated
and able to negotiate reasonable contracts. The primary
message that emerges from the analysis presented here is,
therefore, that a balanced approach in the application of the
patent exhaustion doctrine is required. Expanding the strict
application of the doctrine in multilevel production settings
for licenses between two businesses would likely have
detrimental effects for end consumers and industry
participants. A more flexible application of the exhaustion
doctrine, where its presence would be inferred only in the
absence of license clauses to the contrary, is the preferable
approach from an economic perspective.
In other settings involving end consumers, first sale has
more of a role to play in creating certainty, but even here
there are some narrow circumstances where relaxing the
doctrine could be beneficial to consumers. Keeping the
possible benefits to consumer welfare in mind, such as
increased consumer choice and potentially lower prices for
restricted rights, will lead to a more sensible application of
the first sale doctrine.

